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This paper treats local governments as utility maximizing agents when they allocate resources
among different service sectors. We present estimates for eight service sectors, based on a
modified version of the extended linear expenditure system (ELES) and using observations at the
municipal level for Norway. Our econometric model recognizes user fees and budget deficits as
endogenous variables. Moreover, the model accounts for heterogeneity in local tastes and
production costs. Price information for local public services is not available in the data. However, by
allowing for heterogeneity in the marginal budget share parameters, we achieve identification of the
complete ELES. The empirical results show that local public services are in general price-inelastic.
Welfare services like education, social services and care for the elderly and disabled are income-
inelastic, while infrastructure is rather income-elastic. A strong flypaper effect is revealed by the
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31. Introduction
Earlier local public finance and expenditure studies are either focusing on the trade-off between
locally imposed taxes and total local public spending, or on the allocation of total expenditures on
various service sectors when total expenditures are considered to be exogenous. The present study
aims at analysing local public fiscal and spending behavior in a simultaneous setting. The common
approach assumes that the fiscal and spending behavior is consistent with the preferences of the
median voter. Our modelling approach differs from the standard median voter model by considering
the dominant party or coalition,1 represented by the local government, rather than the median voter as
the decision-making unit. From the local government's viewpoint, the decision problem consists of
choosing the best combination of locally imposed taxes, budget surplus or deficit, and output in public
services subject to the constraint that local government spending plus budget surplus cannot exceed
grants from the central government plus local taxes. As suggested by Barro (1972) and Johnson
(1979) a major advantage of this modelling approach is that it allows different impacts of central
government grants and residential income on the fiscal and spending policy of the local government.
There appears to be strong empirical evidence in support of greater impact on local public spending
from an increase in grants than from an equivalent increase in residential income. This regularity was
called the "flypaper effect" by Gramlich and Galper (1973). Although the median voter models can be
modified to account for flypaper effects, it appears rather artificial to allow for different tax and
spending responses of grants-in-aid and residential income when the median voter is considered to be
the decision-maker.2 Furthermore, as applied to disaggregated analysis of spending, the median voter
approach imposes rather curious restrictions on voter preferences.3
The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the understanding of the variety in the fiscal
and spending behavior of local governments. The empirical analysis, which uses expenditure and
fiscal data of Norwegian municipalities, is based on an application of a Stone-Geary utility function
where local governments are assumed to have preferences over user fees (local taxes), budget surplus
and output on eight service sectors, where user fees are treated as a negative good. The derived
demand system differs from the extended linear expenditure system (ELES) by treating total income
as well as total spending as endogenous variables, and by allowing the present value of changes in
future exogenous incomes to differ from zero. The estimation of the demand system is based on the
local government accounts and community characteristics for 1993. These data do not include
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 For a discussion of this approach and alternative expenditure decision models we refer to Inman (1979) and Bahl et al.
(1980).
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 For a further discussion we refer to Barro (1972) and Johnson (1979).
3
 See Riker and Ordeshook (1973), Kramer (1973) and Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
4information on prices. However, we achieve identification of the complete demand system by
accounting for heterogeneity in the marginal propensities to charge fees, to spend and to save.
Allowing for heterogeneity in the parameters of the demand system makes the Engel curves more
flexible, and thus to a certain extent accomodate the conventional criticism against the LES and the
ELES.
Our modelling approach permits the income and price elasticities to depend on variables that reflect
differences in costs of providing minimum required service standards, as well as in taste patterns
across local governments. Thus, we provide a detailed analysis of the expenditure effects of various
community characteristics and of the fiscal and spending responses of local governments from an
increase in exogenous income or prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the institutional constraints
that local governments face in Norway and to a description of the theoretical framework. Section 3
deals with empirical specification of the model. Section 4 reports the estimated parameters and
elasticities. Results from out-of-sample predictions are displayed and discussed in Section 5. A brief
summary and conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. The choice environment of local governments in Norway
In Norway local governments face balanced budget rules, income tax rules and other institutional
constraints introduced by the central government. The constraints set by the central government have
a significant impact on the choice environment of local governments including the budget constraint.
Thus, information on the choice environment helps to clarify the definition of endogeneous and
exogeneous variables in our modelling framework. The budget constraint is defined by
(2.1) y v u p q
i
s
i i+ = +
=
∑0
1
,
where y is exogenous income, v is user fees, u0 is budget surplus, and pi and qi are price and quantity
in service sector i.
The major part of local government income is general grants-in-aid from the central government and
local income and property taxes. These incomes define the exogenous income y.4 Grants-in-aid are
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5mainly of a revenue-sharing or lump-sum type. Since matching grants only constitute a minor part of
the total grants, we treat all grants as exogenous. The grant programme is financed by a national
income tax which is collected by the central government. Local income and property taxes can be
treated as exogenous variables since tax bases as well as tax rates are determined by the central
government.
There is, however, one important supplementary revenue resource to the centralized system of
financing. Local governments have wide discretion to charge user fees in payment for services
received by residents. Following Borge (1995), we assume that user fees are fiscally motivated. Their
purpose is to raise revenue in order to finance the production of local public services. Consequently,
fee income (v) is the major local tax instrument in our model, while all other sources of income are
treated as exogenous. In 1993 user fees on average accounted for 14 per cent of total local government
incomes.
User charges in some services like kindergartens are set by local governments. Other services like
primary schools are free of charge. Infrastructure services can be charged provided that charges do not
exceed the costs of providing the services. However, this regulation is rather vague due to
measurement and control problems and can be considered as a soft constraint.
Beyond the centralized system of financing, local governments also meet an extensive set of
regulations and legal constraints. For example, the Local Government Act makes provisions against
budget deficits. Although local governments face a balanced budget rule, budget deficits are regularly
observed in the accounts. Thus, this is a case of a soft constraint. For this reason, the surplus is treated
as endogenous in the analysis. However, although the budget rule does not work as an effective limit
on current spending, it may still to some extent act to restrain borrowing and prevent long-term budget
deficits.
A prevalant feature of local government in Norway is the freedom to make priorities over local public
service production. Local governments can undertake whatever task they find desirable, and allocate
resources as they like. But even this freedom is not totally unlimited. Different client groups have
statutory rights to receive certain services for which local governments are given the responsibility.
For example, the primary education for children 7-15 years of age is obligatory, the poor have a right
to receive social benefits, and the elderly and disabled are entitled to be taken care of. It is the duty of
local governments to meet these and a few other obligations given by the central government.
6Not only types of services, but also service levels are affected by central government regulations.
Local governments face national standards of maximum class sizes and maximum travelling distance
to school for pupils in primary schools. Such national standards limit the scope for local priorities.
The aim of these and other regulations is to ensure a minimum required size and quality of local
public services across municipalities. Although the minimum standards are not specified in monetary
terms, they certainly affect local government expenditures. For instance, the national norm of
maximum travelling distance to school increases education expenditures in sparsely populated areas.
2.2. Prices and output
The budget constraint (2.1) introduces a division between prices and quantities in local public service
production. We will now derive a concept of prices and quantities that is based on observable
heterogeneity in the cost functions. One advantage of this approach is that effects of national service
standards and other regulations can be integrated in the model.
The lack of adequate measures for public output is a major problem in the analysis of demand for
public services. Using expenditure as a proxy for output, which relies on the assumption of constant
prices, is obviously in conflict with reality. Alternatively, we may use the standard tax price which is
defined to be equal to the median voter’s tax share multiplied by the unit cost of each service. 5 This
approach is, however, based on controversial assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that the median
voter receives the median income. Moreover, the median voter's share is not appropriate as basis for
the definition of prices when the local government rather than the median voter is treated as the
decision-making unit. In this case it is useful to base the discussion of price effects on measures of
unit costs in local public production.
Unit costs for public services are usually derived from factor input prices.6 In the public employment
approach developed by Ehrenberg (1973) and Bahl et al. (1980), employment is used as a proxy for
output in a Leontief fixed-factor relation where nonlabor expenditure is assumed constant per unit of
employment.7 Unit cost measures can thus be derived from wage data. However, this approach is not
without drawbacks. First, Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) draw a distinction between the output
produced directly by the public sector (termed "D-output") and the output that is of primary concern
to the citizen-consumer (termed "C-output"). D-output is a function of purchased inputs; C-output is a
function of D-output and the community environment. Even if the median voter is not assumed to be
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 See Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Ehrenberg (1973), Bahl et al. (1980), Schwab and Zampelli (1987), and Borge and
Rattsø (1995).
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 The public employment approach has been applied to Norway by Rattsø (1989) and Borge and Rattsø (1995).
7decisive, it does not follow that the local government is not at all concerned about C-output. Yet, the
employment proxy is exclusively a measure of D-output.
Second, the public employment approach implicitly assumes that labor is homogenous within each
service producing sector. However, most public services employ workers with different skills and
professional qualifications. For instance, one have to assume that physicians, nurses and clerical
assistants in public health care are equally productive. Thus, it is not recognized that wage cost
differentials may reflect variations in labor productivity. When labor within a service is heterogenous,
it becomes less plausible to assume a Leontief fixed-factor technology.
Third, when average wage rates are used as price variables, it may introduce simultaneity biases in the
econometric model. In Norway, wages for different professions employed by local governments are
mainly set in a bargaining process at the national level. However, due to local variations in
community environment, local governments may choose different production techniques to meet local
demands. Therefore, by the choice of production technique and combination of different types of
labor, the average wage rate is endogenous in the local government decision process. The price
variable is endogenous because inputs are in fact substitutable.
In this paper we adopt an indirect method for identifying price elasticities. Let the production function
for service sector i be given by
(2.2) q f i si i i i= =( , ), , , .. .,x z 1 2
where xi is a vector of factor inputs and zi is a vector of community characteristics that affect
production opportunities. Assuming constant returns to scale and cost minimization, the derived cost
function is given by
(2.3) C q p qi i i i i i i i( , , ) ( , )w z w z=
where wi is a vector of factor prices and pi is unit cost in sector i. Since wage rates in the public sector
in Norway are set in a centralized system of bargaining, it seems plausible to assume that wage rates
do not vary across municipalities. The more conventional assumption of constant prices on material
inputs may derive from competition within a national factor market. Thus, it appears likely that
variation in unit costs across municipalities solely is due to variation in local production opportunities
which can be captured by relevant community characteristics.
82.3. Constrained maximization by the dominant party or coalition
This paper treats local governments as utility maximizing agents when they determine the levels of
expenditures on various services as well as the level of user fees and budget deficits to finance these
expenditures. The decision-making unit is a dominant political party or a coalition of parties. Local
government decisions are assumed to be made on a per capita basis. As Inman (1971), Barro (1972),
Ehrenberg (1973) and Johnson (1979) we use a Stone-Geary specification of the utility function.
However, as opposed to their approach we allow for budget surpluses and deficits and follow Barro
(1972) and Johnson (1979) by treating local taxes8 (user fees) as an endogenous variable. Thus, local
governments are assumed to have preferences over user fees (v), budget surplus9 (u0) and levels of output
( )q q q s1 2, , .. .,  on s service sectors which means that the decision-making unit faces an intertemporal
utility maximization problem. By treating total expenditures in the linear expenditure system (LES) as an
endogenous variable, Lluch (1973) developed ELES to deal with consumption and savings behavior
within a given period of time, and demonstrated that this expenditure system can be given an interempor-
al interpretation. Howe (1975) provided an alternative justification of ELES based on an atemporal
maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function. In Howe's approach savings is treated as a commodity
with zero "subsistence quantity". We abolish this constraint and allow for variation in committed
savings. Moreover, as opposed to the standard version of ELES we treat total income as well as total
spending as endogenous variables. Thus, the utility function is assumed to have the following structure
(2.4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W v u q q q v u qs
i
s
i i
i
, , , , . .. ,0 1 2 0 0
1
0
= − − −
=
∏κ α γθ β β
where
(2.5) θ β+ =
=
∑
i
s
i
0
1,
and 0 1 0 1 0 0≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≥β θ γ α κi i ii q u and v, , , .
The utility function (2.4) of the local government decision-making unit increases in q q qs1 2, , ... ,  and
u0, and decreases in v due to the implied reduction in income disposable for private consumption.
Maximizing (2.4) subject to (2.5) and the budget constraint (2.1) yields the following version of the
extended linear expenditure system (ELES)
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 The net operating surplus is defined as current income plus user fees minus current expenditures minus compulsory
installment and interest payments.
9(2.6)
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The γ-parameters are conventionally interpreted as "subsistence" or minimum acceptable quantities of
each of the local public services, and α0 as the minimum acceptable level of savings (fiscal surplus).
Similarly as Johnson (1979) we interpret κ as the maximum acceptable level of local taxes (user fees).
Moreover, y pj j+ − −∑κ α γ0  represents "supernumerary" income which is distributed between
the private and the local public sectors in line with the marginal shared parameter θ. The local public
share ( )1− θ  of the supernumerary income is distributed among the local public services including
fiscal surplus in proportion to the parameters ( )β θi i s1 0 1− =, , , .. ., .  Note that ( )[ ]
i
s
i
=
∑ − =
0
1 1β θ .
Although we have used an atemporal framework in deriving the ELES version defined by (2.6) it can,
as for the standard ELES, be given an intertemporal interpretation. The standard ELES assumes that
exogenous income is constant over time which is equivalent to the assumption of zero committed
savings in the atemporal version of ELES. Our modified version of ELES includes an additional
parameter ( )α 0  that captures the presence of committed savings. In the intertemporal setting the
parameter α0 can be interpreted as the present value of changes in future exogenous incomes which
means that exogenous income is allowed to vary over time. Thus our modified version of ELES may
justify the presence of deficit financing.10
3. Empirical model specification
3.1. Endogenous variables
Our model specification relies on the sector classification that forms the basis of the local government
accounts. This classification, which reflects central regulations and sectorspecific minimum required
standards as well as priorities of local governments, is defined by the following eight service sectors:
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1. Administration
2. Education
3. Child care
4. Health care
5. Social services
6. Care for the elderly and disabled
7. Culture
8. Infrastructure
These eight expenditure categories together with the budget surplus and the fee income define the
endogenous variables in our model. The budget surplus and the fee income are denoted sectors 0 and
9, respectively. Summary statistics are reported in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of budget surplus, user fees and eight expenditure groups for 
municipalities in Norway in 1993. 1000 NOK per capita
Sector 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mean 0.87 2.16 5.72 1.67 1.26 1.16 6.49 1.25 3.85 3.41
Minimum -3.59 0.75 3.54 0.35 0.45 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.29 1.52
Maximum 25.33 7.86 14.92 5.78 5.56 3.29 17.51 4.01 16.62 8.00
Standard deviation 1.92 1.09 1.37 0.74 0.71 0.51 2.08 0.52 1.77 0.89
Table 3.1 demonstrates that per capita expenditure is largest in sector 6 (care for the elderly and
disabled), followed by sector 2 (education), sector 8 (infrastructure) and sector 1 (administration).
There is considerable variation in sectorspecific per capita expenditures across municipalities as well
as in per capita budget surplus and fee income, that may motivate a structural analysis of the local
government accounts. Previous empirical analyses of Norwegian local governments' fiscal and
spending behavior have restricted to focus on either the allocation of a fixed income on different
services or the financing of local public spending. 11
3.2. Specification of heterogeneity in the structural parameters
The estimation of (2.6) requires information on price variation for all local public services. Our data
do not include direct information on prices. Thus, it is convenient to use the conventional expenditure
formulation of (2.6),
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 See Borge and Rattsø (1993 and 1995) and Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen (1995) for analyses of the expenditure structure,
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(3.1) ( )
( )
u y i s
v y
i i i= + + − =
= − + −
α β κ α
κ θ κ α
, , , , . .. ,0 1 2
where u p qi i i=  is expenditure on service sector i ( )i ≠ 0 , α γi i ip=  is subsistence requirement or
minimum required expenditure on service sector i ( )i ≠ 0  and α α α− =
=
∑0
1i
s
i  is the minimum
required expenditure on all local public services.
Similarly as standard LES and ELES the system (3.1) is not fully identified when price information is
not available. The standard way of achieving identification is to introduce one additional restriction,
for example by setting one of the αi equal to zero. This practice suffers, however, from lack of
convincing theoretical arguments. An alternative strategy is to allow for heterogeneity in the
parameters and impose an identifying functional form on the parameter-heterogeneity. Pollak and
Wales (1978) have described this procedure as "translating" the demand system. This approach
appears particularly attractive since differences in fiscal and spending behavior across local
governments may arise from differences in costs to attain minimum standards on various services, as
well as from different taste patterns.
Let z z z r1 2, , ... ,  be r variables that are assumed to affect the sectorspecific subsistence expenditures,
the minimum acceptable fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable level of user fees. Similarly, let
t t t m1 2, , .. .,  be m variables that are assumed to capture variation in preferences with regard to
allocation of the supernumerary income. Specifically, we postulate a linear functional form
(3.2)
α α α
κ κ κ
i i
j
r
ij j
j
r
j j
z i s
z
= + =
= +
=
=
∑
∑
0
1
0
1
0 1, , , ... ,
and
(3.3)
β β β
θ θ θ
i i
j
m
ij j
j
m
j j
t i s
t
= + =
= +
=
=
∑
∑
0
1
0
1
0 1, , , .. .,
.
Furthermore, by imposing the following restrictions on the parameters in (3.3)
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(3.4)
θ β
θ β
j
i
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ij
i
s
i
j m+ = =
+ =
=
=
∑
∑
0
0
0
0
0 1 2
1
, , , ...,
,
the adding-up constraint (2.5) is fulfilled.
By closer examination of the reduced form of the demand system defined by (3.1)-(3.4) it is evident
that the demand system is completely identified provided that the two sets of heterogeneity variables
(z and t) do not coincide.
In order to estimate the demand system defined by (3.1)-(3.4) we have to specify the variables (z and
t) that are expected to capture the heterogeneity in the subsistence expenditures, minimum acceptable
budget surplus and maximum acceptable level of user fees, and in preferences for allocation of
supernumerary income. Obviously, the selection of z and t has to depend on characteristics of the
choice environment with particular reference to the impact of central government regulations.
Analyses of public expenditures typically assume that sosioeconomic and demographic variables capture
variations in tastes for local public services. 12 Schwab and Zampelli (1987) argue that not only tastes, but
also the production process is likely to vary across municipalities. They demonstrate that failure to incorpo-
rate community characteristics in production and cost functions can yield misleading results. This means
that there are two sources that can justify the selection of explanatory variables. Heterogeneity in the model
parameters can either derive from heterogeneous preferences or from heterogeneous production costs.
In order to disentangle the two types of heterogeneity, it is convenient to exploit the traditional
interpretations of the ELES parameters. As already mentioned, the parameters αi ( )i ≠ 0 are associated
with unit costs and minimum standard requirements. Unit costs may vary either because of different
production technologies or different factor prices. In the case of local public services, minimum
requirements and other regulations are given by the central government. In our framework the
subsistence quantities are considered as minimum standards for public services reflecting national
regulations or norms developed jointly by the municipalities. Consequently, the α-parameters are
assumed to depend solely on production technology and cost structure. By contrast, the allocation of
discretionary spending or supernumerary income, the θ and β-parameters, are assumed to vary with
local taste. Thus, the marginal budget share parameters depend on taste variables.
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The assumption that taste variables affect marginal budget shares, but not subsistence expenditures
enables us to identify the complete demand system. It is, however, not necessary for identification that
all variables in z and t are mutually exclusive. However, this structure agrees well with conventional
interpretations of the ELES model.
Due to their soft nature the central government regulations are not suitable for being directly
integrated in the model. However, these regulations ought to be reflected in the selection of
determinants of local government expenditure variations. Specifically, the sector-specific subsistence
spending, the minimum fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable user fees are assumed to depend
on the central government regulations.
The due clients in services like education, child care, social services and care for the elderly and
disabled are characterized by social and demographic variables. Consequently, demographic variables
are one important group of factors explaining variations in subsistence expenditures. Subsistence
expenditures are also assumed to vary with the settlement pattern within the municipality, scale
properties, climatic conditions and sewage purification regulations. The precise definitions of these
variables are displayed in Table 4.1 in Section 4.1 and Table D.1 in Appendix D.
Lluch (1973) and Howe (1975) implicitly assume that α0  is equal to zero. A critique against the
atemporal ELES version of Howe is that savings must be non-negative to be consistent with utility
maximization (see Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977)). This is a rather implausible constraint.
However, by including the parameter α0 , it is only required that savings must exceed the minimum
savings parameter, which can be negative. Another advantage is, as shown in equation (3.2), that we
can introduce heterogeneity in the minimum savings parameter.
The Local Government Act contains a balanced budget rule that prohibits local governments to plan
for persistent deficits. However, the budget rule does not exclude adjustments to variations in annual
incomes, which may result in temporary deficits. Indeed, budget deficits are regularly observed in the
local government accounts. Local governments may adjust the fiscal surplus as a response to income
fluctuations over time. This is done in order to attain a smoother time path of expenditures, so that
local government activities are protected from casual income fluctuations. The budget surplus is used
as a buffer device that absorbs parts of the short-term economic fluctuations and may justify the
following structure in minimum fiscal surplus,
(3.5) α α α0 00 01= + ∆y
14
where ∆y  is the change in real exogenous income from the previous year. Since −α 0  is equal to the
present value of changes in future exogenous income it follows that y − α 0  can be interpreted as
permanent exogenous income. The constant term ( )−α 00  is assumed to capture the present value of a
long-term growth trend in exogenous income. Historical figures suggest that there is a positive growth
trend in exogenous income for local governments in Norway. For positive growth trend and no change
in current income ( )α 00 0 0< =and y∆ , permanent income is higher than current income. When
permanent income is higher than current income, local governments may want to accelerate current
spending by deficit financing. However, the balanced budget rule imposed by the central government
may be seen as an attempt to restrict α00  downwards, or more specifically, that the parameter should
be non-negative.
Local governments are allowed to smooth out income fluctuations, as long as they do not operate with
a structural, or persistent deficit. The parameter α01 in the specification (3.5) of α0 is assumed to
capture adjustmens to short-term fluctuations in exogenous income. When ∆y is large and α01 is
positive, the local government expects lower increases in future exogenous incomes. By contrast, a
small positive or negative ∆y may justify a temporary budget deficit since local governments then
expect higher future incomes.
The results reported by Borge (1995) show that fee income increases with increasing exogenous
municipal income. At first glance this result may seem inconsistent with our model. However, local
governments may not have a strong inclination to reduce user charges, since user charges are not
allowed to exceed the unit costs in service provision. An exogenous income increase gives local
governments the opportunity to supply larger quantities without increasing user charges. Even if user
charges per unit are reduced, the volume increase may counteract such reductions, such that total fee
income increases. This mechanism is incorporated in our model by allowing the maximum acceptable
fee income to increase with the level of exogenous income.13
(3.6) κ κ κ α α= + − −0 1 2 5( )y
where α2  are subsistence expenditures in education and α5  are subsistence expenditures in social
services. Subsistence expenditures in education and social services are subtracted since such services
are provided free of user charges. When κ1 0> , equations (3.1) and (3.6) show that a change in
exogenous income y affects the fee income v in two different ways. Since user fees is a negative good,
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exogenous income has a direct negative effect on user fees. However, this negative effect is
counteracted by a positive indirect effect which acts through the maximum acceptable fee income.
The total effect may be positive, zero or negative.
The above discussion concerns variables that are assumed to capture heterogeneity in the subsistence
expenditures, the minimum acceptable fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable level of user fees.
As suggested above there may also be heterogeneity in preferences for allocation of supernumerary
income. Politics at the local level is characterized by representative democrazy and a multi-party
system in which the division between socialist and non-socialist parties is regarded as a major
cleavage.14 Thus, priorities are affected by the party composition of the municipal council. For a given
party composition, priorities may depend on political strength and party concentration in the council.
The reelection constraint may also induce politicians to be sensitive to popular tastes and attitudes
towards local public services in the electorate. We assume that such tastes vary across subgroups of
the population, as a function of socioeconomic status. Education level and private disposable income
are used as indicators of social composition of the population. We assume that party priorities are
partly ideological and partly adjusted towards the tastes of dominating socioeconomic groups.
3.3. The flypaper effect
User fees is the only tax instrument in our model that local governments can use to reallocate
resources between the private and the local public sector. In analyses where the local decision-maker
is treated as a median voter with full discretion to allocate disposable local resources over private and
public goods, it is concluded that the reaction to a lump-sum income increase should be independent
of whether the income increase is received by the private or the local public sector.15 For instance, if
the central government pays more grants-in-aid to the local government, or if the same amount is
distributed directly to local residents as tax reductions, the allocation outcome should be exactly the
same. However, empirical evidence suggests that money given to the private sector tends to stick to
the private sector, and is not taxed away, whilst grants-in-aid to the local government tends to stick in
the public sector and get spent there. An increase in grants to the local government are more
stimulative on local government expenditures than an equivalent in increase in private incomes. This
phenomenon is called the flypaper effect, since money sticks where it hits.16
In our model, the disposable income of local residents is not included in the budget constraint of the
local government. We assume that the private and public sector mix is primarily settled in the political
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process at the national level. Due to the centralized system of financing, local governments have only
a limited scope for adjustments by collecting user charges. Most user charges are bounded not to
exceed unit costs, so there are limited opportunities for local governments to control private
consumption. Therefore, private disposable income does not enter the model through the budget
constraint, but only as a taste variable in line with the education level and the party composition of the
local council. Moreover, the revenue-sharing money granted to local governments are accompanied by
implicit contracts to provide certain goods by the public sector. Consequently, the flypaper effect can
not be considered as an anomaly in our model. Since the scope for local reallocations between the
private and public sector is considerably restricted by central regulations, appearance of a flypaper
effect seems rather plausible.
4. Estimation results
The model (3.1)-(3.4) was estimated on a per capita basis by the maximum likelihood method where
the error terms were assumed to have a multinormal distribution with mean 0 and unrestricted
covariance matrix. The estimates rely on detailed local government accounts and community
characteristics for 426 municipalities in 1993. We find the estimated parameters to be generally
significant and of the expected sign. Estimation results are reported in Sections 4.1 - 4.3. Section 4.1
gives estimated sectorspecific subsistence parameters, minimum fiscal surplus and maximum fee
income. Section 4.2 presents estimates of parameters related to marginal budget shares. Section 4.3
reports the distribution of income and price elasticities. Note that an additional set of variables has
been subject to empirical testing. The results are reported in Appendix D.
4.1. Heterogeneity in subsistence expenditures, minimum required fiscal surplus 
 and maximum acceptable user fees
The set of selected demographic variables and other characteristics that affect subsistence
expenditures, minimum fiscal surplus and maximum user fees is defined in Table 4.1, which also
reports corresponding parameter estimates and t-values. The effects of the age structure of the
residentials on the subsistence expenditure allocation shows to conform with theoretical reasoning.
Children in pre-school age raise child care expenditures, and children in school age raise education
expenditures. We also find a positive, but weakly significant effect of pre-school children on healt
care expenditures. The results show a significant effect in health care for those in the age group 80
years and above. The estimated coefficient for the elderly below 80 years is insignificant for health
care services, but elderly 67-89 years of age increase expenditures in care for the elderly and disabled.
Moreover, it is found that elderly 90 years and above of age have a significant impact on expenditures
in care for the elderly and disabled that is substantially higher than for elderly below 90 years of age.
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For explanatory variables on a per capita form, the corresponding coefficients can be interpreted as
effects of partial marginal changes. Thus, the partial effect of one more child 0-6 years of age is found
to increase child care expenditures by 8.170 NOK. If the child is supported by a single adult, the
expenditure increases by an additional amount of 13.660 NOK. Children also increase costs in health
care, but this effect is only weakly significant. When the population increases by one person in the
age group 7-15 years, the education expenditure increases by 27.850 NOK. If this person is mentally
retarded there are additional costs that amount to 216.530 NOK. By contrast, one additional mentally
retarded person aged 16 years or more increases expenditures by 363.780 NOK in care for the
disabled.
The marginal impact of elderly 80 years and above equals 7.950 NOK in health services. In care for
the elderly and disabled, one more person in the age groups 67-89 years and 90 years and above
increases expenditures by 14.270 NOK and 150.840 NOK, respectively. Mentally retarded children
were, however, neither found to have a significant effect on expenditures in care for the elderly and
disabled nor in child care services. This result suggests that local governments on average devote
more recources to adults than to children with mental retardation. Thus, it seems that local
governments reduce their costs by limiting the relief to parents with mentally retarded children. Such
cost savings can also induce increases in national insurance benefits to the parents. Therefore,
national insurance regulations may in effect weaken incentives to assist the parents.
Larger occurrence of foreign citizens with remote cultural background, and unemployed, divorced and
separated persons are found to significantly increase expenditures in social services. The estimates of
marginal increases in expenditures for these groups are in the range of 12.000 to 15.000 NOK per
person. These effects are due to the relatively high propensities for unemployed, divorced and
immigrants to receive social benefits and other social services.
Education expenditures decrease with population density and increase with average travelling time to
the municipal centre. Such cost increases are due to a decentralized school structure with small
classes in sparesely populated areas. The demand for accessibility also implies higher health care
expenditures when average travelling time increases. One hour increase in average travelling time
increases expenditures by 1.190 NOK per capita in the education sector and by 490 NOK per capita in
health care services.
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Table 4.1. Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum budget surplus and maximum user  
fees parameters a b
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -0.41
(1.89)
-0.37
(1.62)
-0.77
(1.41)
-0.68
(1.98)
-1.06
(2.09)
0.18
(1.72)
-0.34
(0.62)
0.05
(0.35)
-0.26
(0.49)
1.62
(6.75)
Population share 0-6 years of
age
8.17
(3.19)
5.52
(1.58)
Population share 7-15 years
of age
27.85
(8.53)
Population share 80 years
and above
7.95
(2.28)
Population share 67-89 years
of age
14.27
(6.20)
Population share 90 years
and above
150.84
(4.88)
Children 0-6 years with lone
mother/father per capita
13.66
(1.70)
Mentally retarded 7-15 years
per capita
216.53
(2.33)
Mentally retarded 16 years
and above per capita
363.78
(22.03)
Unemployed 16-59 years per
capita
12.78
(3.54)
Divorced/separated 16-59
years per capita
14.71
(6.21)
Foreigners from remote
cultures per capita
12.67
(3.82)
Population density -0.47
(2.12)
0.32
(1.90)
0.15
(1.69)
Personhours (average
travelling time)
1.19
(5.97)
0.49
(3.19)
Population inverted
(thousands)
1.08
(6.08)
0.71
(2.40)
Dummy for small
municipalities
0.22
(2.45)
0.57
(4.65)
0.28
(3.29)
0.31
(3.85)
0.41
(2.14)
Dummy for urban
municipalities
0.19
(1.96)
Dummy for suburban
municipalities
-0.15
(2.89)
Sewage purification degree 0.51
(3.14)
Duration and severity of cold
winter period
0.13
(6.55)
0.16
(7.18)
0.07
(3.42)
0.06
(3.22)
0.10
(2.53)
0.07
(6.41)
0.18
(3.80)
Per capita change in
municipal income
0.44
(8.51)
Per capita exogenous income
excl. of min. exp. eq. 2 and 5
0.18
(6.71)
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34
 a
 The dependent variables are per capita operating result in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per
capita fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner. T-statistics are in parentheses.
b
 The model equation numbers refer to
Equation 0: Net operating result Equation 5: Social services
Equation 1: Administration Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled
Equation 2: Education Equation 7: Culture
Equation 3: Child care Equation 8: Infrastructure
Equation 4: Health care Equation 9: Fee income
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The estimation results indicate that health care expenditures depend positively on the population
density of the municipality. The explanation may be that ill-health frequencies are higher in densely
populated areas due to higher exposure to air pollution and unhealthy life style. The estimation shows
that culture expenditures also tend to increase with population density. This effect is allowed for in
the model, although the estimate is hardly significant. Cultural services are usually centrally located,
but may serve sparesely populated sorrounding areas as well, even outside the municipality. The latter
effect emerges in the coefficient which shows that suburban municipalities have significantly lower
expenditures on culture activities than otherwise similar non-suburban municipalities. The culture
expenditures of suburban municipalities are estimated to fall below those of other municipalities by
150 NOK per capita.
Inverse population size and the dummy variable for small municipalities are included to account for
economies of scale or centrality. The two variables are included to test for the possibility that
diseconomies may either decline gradually or abruptly as a function of population. Significant scale
economies show to be present in all services except social services and culture. Scale economies are
particularly significant in the administration sector. Costs of urbanization are found to affect the
social services. Social care expenditures of urban municipalities exceed those of other municipalities
by 190 NOK per capita.
High requirements for sewage purification increase infrastructure expenditures significantly. A long
an severe cold period in winter increases expenditures for administration, education, child care, health
care, care for the elderly and disabled, culture and infrastructure. These effects arise from higher
heating costs and infrastructure maintenance costs in cold periods.
In agreement with the hypothesis, minimum acceptable fiscal surplus depends significantly on
changes in municipal income relative to the preceding year. The negative sign of the constant term of
the minimum acceptable fiscal deficit suggests that local governments expect a positive long-term
growth in exogenous income. Approximately 44 percent of the temporal change in exogenous income
is used to improve the budget balance.
Higher exogenous income is assumed to increase maximum acceptable fee income, because the local
government can supply larger quantities without increasing user charges per unit. Thus, although user
charges are reduced, the volume may increase and counteract this effect and lead to an increase in
total fee income. The coefficient estimate is highly significant. An increase of 1.000 NOK in
exogenous income induces an increase in maximum acceptable fee income by 180 NOK.
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Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the distribution of estimated minimum required expenditures,
minimum acceptable budget surplus and maximum acceptable user fees. Total subsistence
expenditures for each municipality is equal to the sum of subsistence expenditures in the 8 service
sectors, and amounts on average to 17.850 NOK per capita. The variation across municipalities ranges
from a minimum of 11.600 NOK per capita to a maximum of 25.310 NOK per capita. Education
(4.780 NOK per capita on average) and care for the elderly and disabled (5.450 NOK per capita on
average) emerge as the two sectors with highest mean subsistence expenditures.
Table 4.2. Summary statistics of the distribution of estimated sectorspecific subsistence 
expenditures, minimum required fiscal surplus and maximum acceptable user fees. 
1000 NOK
α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 κ α - α0 α α + κ
Mean -0.32 1.46 4.78 1.13 0.92 1.16 5.45 0.84 2.11 4.36 17.85 17.52 21.88
Minimum -2.64 0.57 3.09 0.70 0.44 0.46 2.37 0.43 1.03 2.77 11.60 11.84 15.17
Maximum 2.05 5.66 7.41 2.44 1.86 2.34 12.17 1.45 3.86 14.51 25.31 25.15 36.37
St. dev. 0.43 0.58 0.70 0.24 0.25 0.32 1.40 0.19 0.56 1.25 2.81 2.81 3.65
Estimated subsistence expenditures prove to be positive in every service sector and each municipality.
However, estimated minimum fiscal surplus take both negative and positive values. The constant term
in the function for minimum acceptable fiscal surplus (shown in Table 4.1) is negative. This implies
that a local government that faces no changes in exogenous income and have zero supernumerary
income will decide to have a deficit. Thus, the requirement of balanced budgets does not work as an
effective binding constraint. Only 19 percent of the municipalities had minimum fiscal surpluses
above zero. These municipalities faced income increases of at least 940 NOK per capita.
In Norway local governments face minimum national standards in services like education, social
services and care for elderly and disabled. Thus, we expect that the subsistence expenditures of these
service sectors account for a larger share of the total sectorspecific expenditures than the remaining
service sectors. The results of Table 4.3 confirm this hypothesis.
Table 4.3. Subsistende expenditures as shares of total sectorspecific expenditures. Per cent
Expenditure
sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
67.6 83.6 67.7 73.0 99.5 84.0 67.2 54.8
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There is considerable variation in estimated maximum acceptable fee income which on average was
4.360 NOK per capita. The lowest and highest maximum acceptable user fees were 2.770 NOK and
14.510 NOK per capita, respectively.
The model is consistent with utility maximization provided that spending levels exceed subsistence
levels and user fees are below the maximum acceptable level. These constraints imply that
supernumerary income must be non-negative. Predictions for supernumerary income are positive for
all municipalities, except for one observation with a small negative value.
4.2. Heterogeneity in marginal budget shares
Table 4.4 gives the estimated coefficients of the marginal budget shares. The budget surplus, child care
and culture expenditures, and fee income increase significantly with increasing private disposable
income. User fees is the main instrument that local governments can use to reallocate recources from the
private to the local public economy. Thus, the response of fees to private income changes can be
interpreted as a conventional income effect. Municipalities with comparatively rich local residents also
show to have a special preference for child care services, as reflected in the marginal budget shares. This
is a plausible result, since rich parents tend to work more hours and demand more child care services.
Higher production of child care may also bring about higher municipal fee income. Spending on culture
services are also increasing with residential income.
Table 4.4. Estimates of marginal budget share parametersa b
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -0.190
-
0.113
(2.68)
0.164
(2.10)
-0.251
(4.36)
0.125
(2.10)
-0.012
(0.25)
0.268
(2.44)
-0.076
(2.49)
0.348
(3.75)
0.511
(6.27)
Per capita private disposable
income
0.371
-
0.003
(0.08)
0.018
(0.22)
0.236
(3.94)
-0.044
(0.68)
0.025
(0.43)
-0.150
(1.30)
0.063
(2.06)
-0.195
(1.85)
-0.326
(3.64)
Average education level for
persons 30-59 years
0.027
-
-0.007
(0.78)
-0.032
(2.22)
0.031
(3.51)
-0.028
(2.40)
0.002
(0.19)
-0.013
(0.60)
0.037
(4.52)
0.010
(0.60)
-0.027
(1.76)
Share of socialists in
municipal council
-0.254
-
0.013
(0.45)
-0.015
(0.29)
0.123
(4.51)
-0.002
(0.05)
-0.021
(0.84)
0.072
(1.14)
0.026
(1.02)
0.133
(2.01)
-0.076
(1.45)
Herfindahl-index for party
concentration
0.170
-
-0.054
(0.90)
0.023
(0.28)
0.002
(0.06)
0.037
(0.49)
-0.014
(0.31)
-0.018
(0.16)
-0.020
(0.48)
-0.074
(0.73)
-0.051
(0.54)
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34
a
 The dependent variables are per capita operating result in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner, except for private disposable income,
which is in hundreds of thousands. T-statistics are in parentheses.
b
 The model equation numbers refer to
Equation 0: Net operating result Equation 5: Social services
Equation 1: Administration Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled
Equation 2: Education Equation 7: Culture
Equation 3: Child care Equation 8: Infrastructure
Equation 4: Health care Equation 9: Fee income
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The higher the education level, the stronger are the local government preferences for child care
services and culture services, and the weaker is the aversion against user charges. Authorities in well
educated communities put lower priority on education and health care services. This effect might be
due to ommitted cost factors in the subsistence expenditures for education and health care. However,
no such effect occured when we controlled for the effect of the education level in the subsistence
expenditures. Thus, we conclude that the education level is properly included as a taste variable.
The estimates show that socialist parties give special priority to child care services, which is in line
with the socialist program for public welfare and increased female participation in the labour force.
The results also suggest that socialists tend to devote more resources to infrastructure services than
non-socialists. The infrastructure sector comprises different services like public water and sewage
facilities, refuse disposal, public transportation, housing and industrial development. More detailed
analysis is required to throw light on which parts of the sector are favored by socialists. Besides,
socialists have a lower marginal propensity to save than non-socialists. Socialists also tend to collect
more fee income, but this last effect is only slightly significant.
The higher the party concentration in the municipal council, the higher is the marginal propensity to
save. Thus, a strong political leadership has the opportunity to resist pressure for spending increases.
The increase in budget surplus due to party concentration is mainly financed by reductions in
administration and infrastructure expenditures, and by increased user charges.
Table 4.5 reports summary statistics for the estimated marginal budget shares. Marginal budget shares
are defined as the proportions of a marginal increase in income that is distributed to the different
service sectors. Summary statistics for the distribution of the θ and β parameters are reported in Table
4.5. As suggested by equations (3.1) and (3.6) the income derivative for fees will not be equal to θ
since exogenous income also affects κ, and κ depends on exogenous income. Thus, the derivative for
fees with respect to exogenous income is reported in the second column of Table 4.5, assuming that
minimum saving is kept constant. The marginal budget share for the fiscal surplus is defined as the
proportion of the increase in total income (including fees) that is saved for future spending. The
marginal budget shares for the service sectors are standardized such that the shares of the eight service
sectors add up to one, which means that we report the marginal expenditure shares.
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Table 4.5. Summary statistics of the distribution of estimated sectorspecific marginal budget 
shares
θ ∂
∂
v
y
β
θ
0
1−
β
θ β
1
01− −
β
θ β
2
01− −
β
θ β
3
01− −
β
θ β
4
01− −
β
θ β
5
01− −
β
θ β
6
01− −
β
θ β
7
01− −
β
θ β
8
01− −
Mean 0.117 0.043 0.168 0.123 0.162 0.099 0.056 0.001 0.179 0.076 0.304
Minimum -0.043 -0.043 0.062 0.089 0.099 0.000 -0.031 -0.014 0.066 0.031 0.211
Maximum 0.190 0.233 0.412 0.148 0.247 0.300 0.113 0.022 0.216 0.203 0.338
Standard
deviation 0.035 0.042 0.047 0.010 0.018 0.042 0.017 0.006 0.019 0.022    0.017
The model is consistent with utility maximization provided that the estimated θ's and marginal budget
shares are non-negative. The estimated θ's and marginal budget shares are positive for most
observations. There are a few negative predictions for θ and the marginal budget shares in health care
and social services, but these are statistically insignificant. The derivative of fees with respect to
exogeneous income is positive for 89 percent of the municipalities. For fee income, this means that
positive volume effects are dominating over price reductions in response to a wider economic choice
set.
On average 17 percent of a marginal income increase is used for improvement of the fiscal balance.
We observe particularly high marginal expenditure budget shares in infrastructure services. Marginal
budget shares for fiscal surplus and child care services and the derivatives of fees with respect to
exogenous income show to vary considerably between municipalities. By contrast, the marginal
budget shares for administration, education, health care and infrastructure vary modestly, whilst the
marginal budget shares for social services are extremely small for all municipalities.
The estimated effect on fees from an increase in private disposable income of 100 NOK is 3 NOK on
average. This is a rather low figure both in an international context and compared to the effect of
intergovernmental grants. As shown in Table 4.5, the impact of grant money on fee income is on
average positive and will in fact induce reductions in private consumption in most municipalities.
This result owes to the fact that increased volume of local public services dominates over the
tendency to reduce user charges in response to increased municipal income. As a consequence, the
flypaper effects reported in this paper are extraordinary strong.
4.3. The distribution of income and price elasticities
The expressions for Engel, Cournot and Slutsky elasticities are given in Appendix B. The Engel
elasticities are obtained under the assumption that minimum fiscal surplus is unaffected by the income
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change. The endogenous variables that enter into the formulas are replaced by predicted values. Since
we have allowed for heterogeneity in subsistence levels and marginal budget shares it is of interest to
examine how heterogeneity in production costs and local tastes affect the various price and income
elasticities. Table 4.6 reports mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviations of income
elasticities and direct price elasticities. Fiscal surplus elasticities are not included in Table 4.6 since
fiscal surplus may be equal to zero.
Table 4.6. Summary statistics of income and price elasticities
Equation number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Engel elasticities
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
1.09
0.51
1.60
0.17
0.51
0.29
0.79
0.09
1.05
0.01
2.04
0.33
0.82
-0.90
1.81
0.24
0.01
-0.42
0.38
0.12
0.50
0.25
0.83
0.09
1.09
0.60
2.00
0.20
1.47
0.98
2.04
0.17
0.24
-0.50
0.99
0.22
Direct
Cournot elasticities
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
-0.36
-0.76
-0.09
0.11
-0.25
-0.66
-0.12
0.08
-0.34
-0.80
0.00
0.14
-0.27
-0.82
0.37
0.13
0.00
-0.28
0.17
0.05
-0.26
-0.63
-0.10
0.08
-0.34
-0.85
-0.05
0.13
-0.54
-0.90
-0.22
0.13
Direct
Slutsky elasticities
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
-0.26
-0.66
0.02
0.11
-0.11
-0.52
0.02
0.08
-0.25
-0.70
0.02
0.13
-0.22
-0.76
0.35
0.13
0.00
-0.27
0.16
0.04
-0.11
-0.49
0.03
0.07
-0.28
-0.80
0.01
0.13
-0.28
-0.67
0.05
0.13
The income elasticities turn out to be positive, except for a few municipalities with negative
elasticities in health care and social services. For social services, all variation is captured by
unobservables since the estimates in column five of Table 4.4 are insignificant. Hence, the results are
consistent with the assumption of normal goods with the modification that the fee income response is
ambiguous due to the income effect on maximum fees. Infrastructure is a service sector in which
almost all municipalities have income elastic demand. For child care, administration and cultural
services Engel elasticities are on average larger than one. For health care, some municipalities have
income-elastic demand, but on average the demand is income-inelastic. Education, care for the elderly
and disabled, and social services are income-inelastic for all municipalities. The Engel elasticity for
fee income is within the range of -0.50 and 0.99, with a mean of 0.24.
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Apart from the municipalities with negative income elasticities in social servicesand health care, all
direct Cournot elasticities are negative. All goods are price-inelastic, with a Cournot elasticity below
one in absolute value. In resemblance with the results for Engel elasticities, the Slutsky elasticities are
particularly small in social services, education, and care for the elderly and disabled. This may be due
to the fact that these service sectors to a greater extent than the remaining sectors are subject to
requirements and regulations from the central government. Thus, when these requirements are met the
local governments give priority to spending in infrastructure, administration, child care and culture.
Since income and price elasticities depend on municipal income, the pattern of variation with respect
to income may provide essential information. Table 4.7 displays mean elasticities by deciles of total
municipal income. The results for deciles 3-8 vary only slightly and are reported by their mean value.
The mean per capita income in the two lowest, the middle and two highest decile groups are found to
be equal to 16.990, 18.490, 22.910, 30.600, and 40.670 NOK, respectively.
Table 4.7 shows that the Engel elasticities for education and care for the elderly and disabled increase
with per capita income, whilst the Engel elasticities for administration, child care, culture and
infrastructure decrease as a function of income. Hence, Engel elasticities tend to increase with income
for income-inelastic services and decrease with income for income-elastic services. The largest
variation in income elasticities across service sectors is found for municipalities with low per capita
income.
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Table 4.7. Income and price elasticities by deciles of total income
Equation number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Engel elasticities
Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3-8
Decile 9
Decile 10
1.24
1.22
1.10
0.92
0.90
0.42
0.44
0.50
0.58
0.66
1.19
1.18
1.03
0.95
0.98
0.81
0.74
0.81
0.88
0.93
0.03
0.04
0.01
-0.05
-0.03
0.49
0.46
0.49
0.57
0.61
1.14
1.20
1.09
0.99
1.02
1.50
1.50
1.50
1.40
1.34
0.31
0.30
0.22
0.19
0.27
Direct
Cournot elasticities
Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3-8
Decile 9
Decile 10
-0.30
-0.32
-0.35
-0.40
-0.50
-0.18
-0.19
-0.23
-0.32
-0.42
-0.27
-0.30
-0.32
-0.40
-0.52
-0.17
-0.18
-0.24
-0.36
-0.50
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
0.01
-0.20
-0.21
-0.24
-0.32
-0.40
-0.26
-0.29
-0.33
-0.40
-0.54
-0.43
-0.46
-0.53
-0.64
-0.74
Direct
Slutsky elasticities
Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3-8
Decile 9
Decile 10
-0.19
-0.22
-0.25
-0.30
-0.40
-0.04
-0.06
-0.09
-0.17
-0.27
-0.16
-0.20
-0.23
-0.32
-0.44
-0.13
-0.14
-0.19
-0.31
-0.44
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.06
-0.06
-0.09
-0.16
-0.24
-0.18
-0.22
-0.26
-0.35
-0.48
-0.18
-0.20
-0.26
-0.36
-0.48
Table 4.8. Mean values of own and cross Cournot elasticities
          1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9
Price 1 -0.36 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.05
Price 2 -0.22 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 0.00 -0.10 -0.22 -0.30 -0.06
Price 3 -0.05 -0.02 -0.34 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.04
Price 4 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.03
Price 5 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02
Price 6 -0.25 -0.12 -0.24 -0.19 0.00 -0.26 -0.25 -0.34 0.20
Price 7 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.34 -0.05 0.03
Price 8 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.54 0.07
Cross-price elasticities are reported in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. In general, Slutsky cross-price elasticities
are positive and rather small. This substitutability property is implied by the ELES model. Cournot
cross-price elasticities are in general negative which means that the negative income effect is
dominating over the positive substitution effect. However, the Cournot cross price elasticities for fee
income are positive, except for education and social services. For other sectors than education and
social services, increased unit costs operate on fees only through the reduction in supernumerary
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income. The cross-price effects of education and social services on fees are ambiguous because
subsistence expenditures for those sectors also reduce maximum acceptable fees. This is reflected in
the computed elasticities, which take both positive and negative signs.
Table 4.9. Mean values of own and cross Slutsky elasticities
          1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9
Price 1 -0.26 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07
Price 2 0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.01
Price 3 0.04 0.02 -0.25 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
Price 4 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.22 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Price 5 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Price 6 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.11 0.09 0.13 0.27
Price 7 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.28 0.04 0.04
Price 8 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.10 -0.28 0.12
5. Out-of-sample predictions
Although the estimated model parameters are found to be consistent with our theoretical framework it
is important to examine how the model performs with respect to prediction. In this section the
empirical model that was estimated on data for 1993 is used to predict the fiscal and spending
behavior of local governments in 1994. For the sake of comparability the observed accounting data for
1994 were deflated to 1993 prices. The price index for local government consumption in the National
Accounts of Norway was used as deflator. The prediction results are reported in Table 5.1.
The relative mean prediction error in the third row is the difference between the first and the second
row divided by the figures in the first row. The relative mean prediction error is quite small for most
of the service sectors which suggests that there is little evidence of systematic over- or
underprediction by the model. The largest relative mean prediction errors are found for the fiscal
surplus and the health care expenditures.
Table 5.1. Actual and predicted means of endogenous variables for 1994. 1000 NOK per capita1
Equation number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mean actual 1.52  2.16  5.75 1.78  1.14  1.15 6.82  1.26  4.05 3.61
Mean predicted 1.27  2.25  5.81 1.73  1.30  1.16 6.63  1.32  4.03 3.51
Relative mean error 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.03 -0.05  0.00 0.03
Simulated R2 adjusted 0.72  0.85  0.78 0.62  0.36  0.37 0.80  0.63  0.74 0.30
1 The sample for 1994 consists of 429 municipalities.  Out of a total of 435 municipalities, one municipality was
left out because of missing data, and five since they were considered to be outliers.
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The results of Table 5.1 show that the performance is almost as good as the model’s ability to
reproduce the 1993 observations. To visualize the simulation fits, prediction errors in the 10 model
sectors are plotted against a ranking on total income for the municipalities. The plots are reported in
Appendix C. The municipality with the lowest per capita total income is given rank one in the income
ranking, continuing up to the municipality with the highest per capita total income, which is rank 429
in the ranking. There is no systematic relationship between the income level and the prediction errors.
Therefore, the overall impression from the out-of sample predictions is that the model simulates local
government allocations rather well.
6. Summary and conclusion
This paper focuses on the variety in the fiscal policy and the structure of public spending among local
governments. The econometric analysis, which is based on detailed local government accounts for
Norwegian municipalities in 1993, recognizes total spending as well as total income as endogenous
variables. We present estimates for eight service sectors based on a modified version of the extended
linear system (ELES). As opposed to the standard ELES our ELES version allows the present value of
changes in future exogenous incomes to differ from zero. This property justifies the presence of
budget deficits among local governments.
Our data do not include information on prices. However, by using municipality characteristics to
account for heterogeneity in the marginal budget share parameters, we achieve identification of the
complete demand system. This means that we may assess price elasticities even though we have no
direct information on prices. Moreover, allowing for heterogeneity in the parameters of the demand
system makes the Engels curves more flexible, and thus to a certain extent accommodate the
conventional criticism against the LES and the ELES.
Due to observed heterogeneity in local tastes and production costs the paper provides a detailed
analysis of the expenditure effects of various community variables and of the spending responses
from increases in exogenous income and prices. The results show that small municipalities normally
face higher per capita production costs than large municipalities. This regularity is probably due to
scale economics in service production. The effects of the age structure of the residentials on the
allocation of the subsistence expenditures conform with a priori expectations. Furthermore,
expenditures on cultural activities were found to be significantly lower in suburban municipalities
than in otherwise similar non-suburban municipalities, and verifies the claim that suburban
municipalities take advantage of the cultural services offered by urban municipalities. Expenditures
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on most service sectors prove to depend on the climatic conditions of the municipalities. These effects
arise from higher heating costs and infrastructure maintenance costs in cold periods.
Heterogeneity in preferences for allocation of supernumerary income is shown to be properly captured
by variables that reflect the degree of dominance of the socialist parties and the average
socioeconomic status of the municipal population. Local governments that are dominated by socialist
parties give priority to child care services and infrastructure investments. The strong focus on child
care appears to be in line with the socialist program for public welfare and increased female
participation in the labour force.
Expenditures on national welfare services as education, social services and care for the elderly and
disabled are only weakly sensitive to changes in the economic conditions of the municipalities. When
the quality of these services is ensured to be in line with the requirements of the central government, it
seems that the local governments give priority to spending in infrastructure, administration, child care
and culture. The impact of grants-in-aid on fees is on average positive and will induce a reduction in
private consumption for the majority of the municipalities. This result owes to the volume increase in
local public services as a response to increased exogenous income.
In order to examine how the 1993-based model performs with respect to prediction we used it to
predict the fiscal and spending behaviour of local governments in 1994. The results of the out-of-
sample predictions show that the model predicts local governments behavior rather well.
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Appendix A
Data
1. Data from the local government accounts
Observations of the endogenous model variables are provided by the local government accounts
reported for the year 1993. The administration sector in the model solely contains central
administration, while sector administration is included in the service sectors. Expenditures are defined
to include net transfers to municipalities, counties and others. Exogenous income consists of tax
income and net transfers from the central government. The operating result equals current income plus
user fees minus current expenditures minus net interest and installment payments.
2. Data from other sources
The Norwegian population register along with the 1990 Census provide observations of the following
dempographic and municipality variables:
• Total population
• Dummy for small municipalities with less than 5 000 inhabitants
• Population data by age group
• Foreign citizens with remote cultural background (These include citizens of African, Asiatic and
Latin-American countries and also Turkey)
• Persons that are divorced or separated
• Children with a single supporter
• Personhours - residents average travelling time to the center of the municipality
• Population density - share of population living in densely populated areas
• Dummy for urban municipalities containing a center with more than 15 000 inhabitants
• Dummy for suburban municipalities that are not themselves urban, but are near to an urban center
measured in travelling time
The number of mentally retarded by age groups was obtained from the Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs.
The number of unemployed persons was defined equal to the number registered by the Directorate of
Labour.
The purification degree is the share of total sewage disposal capacity that utilizes an intensive
purification process. The data are collected by Statistics Norway at the plant level. To construct data
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at the municipality level we had to divide the capacity in joint sewage plants, where the shares of
persons connected to the plant in different jurisdictions were used as weights.
The information on cold winter periods was delivered by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute. The
cold variable is measured as the average number of degrees below 17 degrees of Celcius per day
through the whole year, recording every day with a temperature above 17 degrees as an observation of
zero.
Private disposable income is derived from the Income register of Statistics Norway. We use the
definition in the register, except that debt interest payments are not subtracted, whilst municipal social
security benefits are subtracted.
The local education level is defined as the average number of years beyond the compulsory 9 years in
primary school accomplished by residents in the age group 30-59 years. The source is the official
register of highest completed educations.
The share of socialist representatives in the local government council was derived from the official
election statistics. The Norwegian Labour Party and all parties to its left are defined as socialist
parties. The Herfindahl-index for party concentration in the local government council was derived
from the same source. Let Sj be the share of representatives from party j in the local council.  Then the
Herfindal-index is defined as
H Sj
j
P
=
=
∑ 2
1
where P is the number of parties. The index takes its maximum value of 1 when a single party holds
all seats in the local council, while the minimum value of 1/P is attained when the seats are equally
divided among the P parties.
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Appendix B
Formulas for computation of elasticities
The parameters αi, βi, θ and κ are computed as defined in equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6). The
heterogeneity vectors z and t are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. The endogenous variables that enter into
the formulas are replaced by predicted values in the computation.
1. Engel elasticities
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3. Slutsky elasticities
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Appendix C
Prediction errors in the model equations, 1000 NOK per capita
Figure C1. Prediction error of net operating result by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C2. Prediction error of administration expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C3. Prediction error of education expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C4. Prediction error of child care expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C5. Prediction error of health care expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C6. Prediction error of social service expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C7. Prediction error of care for the elderly and disabled expenditures by rank of total
municipal income
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Figure C8. Prediction error of culture expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C9. Prediction error of infrastructure expenditures by rank of total municipal income
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Figure C10. Prediction error of fee income by rank of total municipal income
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Appendix D
An extended version of the empirical model
The empirical model reported in Section 4 includes a large set of community characteristics that are
assumed to capture the essential features of heterogeneity in production costs, minimum budget
surplus, maximum user fees, and tastes across municipalities. An additional set of variables that can
be considered as theoretically relevant for capturing heterogeneity in local government behavior has
been subject to empirical testing. The results of the evaluation are reported in this appendix.
1. Variables excluded in ML estimations
The employers’ social security tax rate is regionally differentiated in Norway. We hypothesised that
the tax rate will affect the unit costs in municipal production. Thus, the rate was included in the
heterogeneity functions for subsistence expenditures. In this case the estimation results were not too
encouraging. The overall effect of higher social security tax rate on subsistence expenditures was
found to be negative, implying that unit costs will decrease with higher tax rate. Also, the results
indicate that budget surplus increase and fee incomes decrease with increasing social security tax rate.
We interpret these results as spurious. What is captured could for instance be variations in attitudes or
efficiency that are correlated with centrality and the social security tax rate. It should be recognized
that the expenditure system design is not very suitable to account for substitution between labour and
other inputs in response of changes in relative factor prices. Thus, we chose to ommit the social
security tax rate from the analysis, leaving the subject to future research. The other results of the
analysis are only to a limited degree sensitive to whether or not the tax rate is included.
As mentioned in Section 3, unit costs in education and health care may depend on the education level
of local residents. We found no evidence of such a relationship. Besides, the estimated effect from a
foreign first language on education expenditures was not significant.
The public sector in Norway is organized in three levels, made up by local governments, county
governments and the central government. While local governments are responsible for primary health
care and care for the elderly and disabled, public hospitals are owned and operated by counties or the
central government. Hence, hospital services may to some degree be substitutes for local government
services. A plausible hypothesis is that nearness to a public hospital may reduce municipal
expenditures. To test for this, a hospital dummy variable was included in the subsistence expenditures
for health care and care for the elderly and disabled. The dummy equals 1 in municipalities where
there are located at least one hospital, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients emerged as
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insignificant, although the coefficient for health care was significant in a reduced form version of the
model.
The marginal budget shares are assumed to depend on the party structure in the local councils. The
division between socialist and non-socialist parties may be too coarse to account for the complex
pattern of political cleavages in the Norwegian multy-party system. To test this proposition, the share
of representatives from center parties along the right-left dimension was included as heterogeneity in
the marginal budget shares. None of the coefficients emerged as significant.
2. Other effects excluded in ML estimations
Our preffered model is reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. A more general model specification is reported
in tables D.1 and D.2. Table D.2 corresponds to Table 3.4. In Table D.1, we include all the
hypothesised effects on subsistence expenditures that have been excluded in Table 3.2, due
insignificant parameter estimates.
Table D.1 also includes one variable that is excluded in Table 3.2. The number of mentally retarded
children 0-6 years have no significant effect on expenditures, neighter in child care, health care, nor
care for the elderly and disabled. Furthermore, there is no evidence that health care expenditures are
affected by the number of mentally retarded youth and adults. Expenditures in care for the elderly and
disabled are not affected significantly by the number of mentally retarded children and youth.
The effect of unemployment on health care expenditures is insignificant. The same applies to the
effect of foreigners from remote cultures on school expenditures. This effect was assumed to capture
needs for special lessons.
The effects of scale economies or centrality were tested in all service sectors using the inverted
population and the dummy for small municipalities. The estimates of the coefficients are reported in
Table D.1.
Uban municipalities are expected to have lower education expenditures and higher health care and
culture expenditures than other municipalities. Low education expenditures could arise because
average travelling time to the municipal center capture costs of decentralization that do not apply to
large cities. Higher frequencies of illness or more supply-generated demand in cities may occasion
higher health care expenditures. Higher culture expenditures may derive from municipal liabilities as
a regional center. However, none of these hypotheses were confirmed in the analysis.
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Table D.1. Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum budget surplus and maximum user 
      fees parametersa b
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -0.41
(1.80)
-0.38
(1.59)
-0.60
(1.02)
-0.69
(1.89)
-1.14
(1.77)
0.29
(2.25)
-0.27
(0.42)
-0.02
(0.11)
-0.31
(0.55)
1.75
(7.67)
Population share 0-6 years of
age
8.02
(2.98)
5.86
(1.62)
Population share 7-15 years
of age
26.17
(7.75)
Population share 80 years
and above
8.15
(1.89)
Population share 67-89 years
of age
14.42
(5.44)
Population share 90 years
and above
147.15
(4.45)
Children 0-6 years with lone
mother/father per capita
13.08
(1.50)
Mentally retarded 0-6 years
per capita
54.46
(0.58)
-172.5
(1.25)
85.37
(0.32)
Mentally retarded 7-15 years
per capita
207.47
(2.11)
-38.38
(0.40)
-52.97
(0.30)
Mentally retarded 16 years
and above per capita
7.58
(0.44)
360.05
(14.73)
Unemployed 16-59 years per
capita
1.71
(0.25)
11.11
(2.79)
Divorced/separated 16-59
years per capita
13.99
(5.64)
Foreigners from remote
cultures per capita
-3.71
(0.43)
11.62
(3.24)
Population density -0.27
(1.12)
0.41
(2.16)
0.15
(1.35)
Personhours (average
travelling time)
1.26
(5.37)
0.65
(3.69)
-0.51
(1.26)
Population inverted
(thousands)
1.16
(6.43)
0.32
(0.99)
-0.03
(0.18)
0.32
(1.49)
-0.15
(1.02)
0.66
(1.66)
-0.03
(0.20)
0.18
(0.42)
Dummy for small
municipalities
0.22
(2.03)
0.56
(3.28)
0.31
(2.70)
0.26
(2.58)
-0.04
(0.70)
0.16
(0.61)
0.05
(0.52)
0.43
(1.62)
Dummy for urban
municipalities
-0.24
(0.78)
-0.09
(0.36)
0.22
(1.89)
0.11
(0.93)
Dummy for suburban
municipalities
-0.12
(2.15)
Sewage purification degree 0.49
(2.88)
Duration and severity of cold
winter period
0.13
(6.17)
0.16
(6.68)
0.07
(3.19)
0.06
(2.99)
0.10
(2.19)
0.08
(5.82)
0.18
(3.64)
Per capita change in
municipal income
0.44
(8.19)
Per capita municipal income
excl. of min. exp. eq. 2 and 5
0.16
(6.25)
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.52 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34
a
 The dependent variables are per capita budget surplus in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner. T-statistics are in parantheses.
n=426.
b
 The model equation numbers refer to
Equation 0: Budget surplus Equation 5: Social services
Equation 1: Administration Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled
Equation 2: Education Equation 7: Culture
Equation 3: Child care Equation 8: Infrastructure
Equation 4: Health care Equation 9: Fee income
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Table D.2 Estimates of marginal budget share parameters
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -0.189
-
0.114
(2.24)
0.149
(1.70)
-0.266
(4.11)
0.095
(1.28)
-0.014
(0.24)
0.299
(2.16)
-0.069
(1.93)
0.341
(3.10)
0.512
(5.89)
Per capita private disposable
income
0.386
-
0.006
(0.12)
0.018
(0.19)
0.252
(3.87)
-0.037
(0.46)
0.014
 (0.21)
-0.172
(1.17)
0.059
(1.66)
-0.193
(1.63)
-0.332
 (3.21)
Average education level for
persons 30-59 years
0.023
-
-0.007
(0.71)
-0.024
(1.39)
0.032
(3.07)
-0.018
(1.17)
0.005
(0.41)
-0.018
(0.71)
0.037
(3.77)
0.013
(0.59)
-0.030
(1.56)
Share of socialists in
municipal council
-0.261
-
0.014
(0.43)
-0.017
(0.31)
0.129
(4.01)
-0.001
(0.02)
-0.019
(0.74)
0.074
(0.91)
0.025
(0.88)
0.141
(1.72)
-0.085
(1.52)
Herfindahl-index for party
concentration
0.183
-
-0.057
(0.86)
0.012
(0.11)
0.005
(0.12)
0.027
(0.32)
-0.008
(0.16)
-0.014
(0.10)
-0.019
(0.41)
-0.077
(0.61)
-0.052
(0.52)
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.52 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34
a
 The dependent variables are per capita budget surplus in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner, except for private disposable income,
which is in hundreds of thousands. T-statistics are in parantheses. n=426.
b
 The model equation numbers refer to
Equation 0: Budget surplus Equation 5: Social services
Equation 1: Administration Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled
Equation 2: Education Equation 7: Culture
Equation 3: Child care Equation 8: Infrastructure
Equation 4: Health care Equation 9: Fee income
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